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Introduction
The military and economic expansion of the
central capitalist powers has irrevocably shaped
the destinies of the countries of the Third World
and made the present international system what
it is. Yet the military dimension of that expan-
sion and its continuing effects, both at the peri-
phery and in the advanced industrial countries
themselves, has received remarkably little serious
discussion.
The basic facts of militarism are of such a scale
as to make most of the preoccupations of
development experts and policy-makers pale
almost into insignificance by comparison. World
military expenditures currently run at about
$300 billion a yearmore than the national
products of the countries of South Asia, the Far
East and Africa combined (Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute, 1975 and 1976;
UN, 1972; US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, 1976; Barnaby and Huisken, 1975,
Marchetti and Marks, 1974).
The military expenditures of the industrial
countries are around six per cent of their total
GNP, being more than twenty times greater than
the resources they devote to official development
assistance to the developing countries. The
United States alone spends nearly as much on
its intelligence, surveillance and espionage network
(of which the CIA is only one part) as all the
developed countries taken together spend on
development assistance to the Third World.
Although the developing countries spend much
less on armaments than the advanced industrial
countries (approximately $55 billion in 1974) the
proportion of their GNP devoted to military
spending is roughly the same. Moreover, their
arms expenditures have risen faster than those of
industrial countries (about 17 per cent of the
world total in the mid-1970s compared with
about li per cent a decade earlier), leading to
substantial increases in their arms imports. In-
creases have taken place in most parts of the
Third World, though they are most dramatic in
the Middle East which now imports well over
half the weapons transferred to the Third World.
The value of these arms imports (about $6.6
billion in 1974) has been fast overtaking the
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value of development assistance from the in-
dustrial countries to the Third World. It is esti-
mated that in the space of only two years-1974
and 1975the value of resources transferred to
the Third World in the form of major weapons
increased by more than 60 per cent.
There is considerable international concern about
this rise in arms spending, yet not enough serious
analysis. Is there any connection between arms
spending and the fact that most countries in the
Third World live under authoritarian govern-
ments, the number of which has greatly increased
over the past ten years? To what extent does it
reinforce economic dependence? And what are
the consequences for the distribution of wealth
and power; both nationally within individual
Third World countries and internationally
between them and the advanced industrial coun-
tries?
Rather than summarising what little we know
already, I attempt in this paper to pull some of
these strands together, and to suggest a number
of things that people concerned with these
problems ought to be looking at. In Table 1, I
put forward a model which I propose to use as
a simple aide memoire rather than as a rigorous
theoretical statement. It is based on the presup-
position that any account of the expansion of the
military in the Third World must simultaneously
take into account the special features of military
organisations, of the national context and of the
international environment in which they operate.
That international environment is shaped fur-
thermore, by the historical legacy of imperialism,
in which military force played a critical role in
opening up the countries of the periphery to the
trade and capital of the advanced capitalist
powers. This legacy has, to be sure, been greatly
transformed since the late nineteenth century
when it was at its zenith. Most countries of the
Third World have gained their political indepen-
dence, although many of them remain extremely
vulnerable to external political and military
pressures. New world centresthe USA and the
USSRhave come to the forefront. The consoli-
dation of a bloc of socialist countries means that
the world system is no longer dominated ex-
clusively by a single, capitalist, mode of produc-
tion. This gives the countries of the Third World
greater room for manoeuvre, allowing at least
some of them to distance themselves from foreign
domination. Yet at the same time the cold war
between capitalist and socialist powers adds to the
external pressures on them to ally themselves to
one side or the other.
In this article I shall pay special attention to the
significance of the export of military technology
Improvements in
technology of
force (weapons
and technological
'software')
Transformation of
economic surpluses
into armaments
Maintenance of
military hierarchy
and increase in its
capacity to coerce
Positions in
military hierarchy as
basis of class
alignment
The Technology of Force, 'Modernisation' and
Technological Dependence
The expansion of the advanced capitalist powers
of Europe and North America which took place
between the sixteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies was achieved as much by force of arms as
by trade and investmentor at least they were
two sides of the same coin. To put it crudely,
better methods of manufacture of industrial goods
resulted in improved armaments and these in turn
made possible the conquests which opened up
new markets for the factories and workshops of
the industrial powers.
Since the dismantling of the great colonial
empires, the technological advantages of the
central countries in terms of armaments have not
merely remained, they have greatly increased.
This is largely the consequence of rapid technical
progress. Military Research and Development has
increased to around 10 to 15 per cent of total
world military spending, compared with only one
per cent before World War II. For the develop-
ing countries the critical fact is that virtually all
of this R & D takes place in the advanced in-
dustrial countries, 85 per cent in the USA and
TABLE 1
'Modernisation' via
imports of technology
of force
Relationship between
accumulation of means
of force and national
economy
Use of military force
to uphold (or challenge)
power of politically
dominant groups and
classes
Role of military in
formation and reproduction
of social classes and
uneven development
and of the international arms economy for the
countries of the Third World (see the first two
lines of Table 1). In a later issue of the IDS
Bulletin I shall take up the remaining two
themes: the role of force and of military pro-
fessionalism in establishing the hegemony of the
advanced industrial powers in the developing
countries.
Technological dependence
upon the technology of
force of the advanced
industrial powers
Economic dependence,
depletion of scarce foreign
exchange through the
international arms economy
Political clientage,
vulnerability to great
power interventicm and
influence
Transnationalisation of
class structure via
military professionalism
the USSR alone and a further 10 per cent in the
four other most important arms producers,
Britain, France, West Germany and China. It is
true, to be sure, that some of the more industrial-
ised Third World countries manufacture part of
their own arms, one or two like Brazil or India
even having a certain amount of design capa-
bility. Yet the greater part of this manufacture
takes place under licence, makes use of compo-
nents available only from the major arms sup-
pliers, and is closely tied in with their other
economic and military links.
The implications of this technological dependence
for the way Third World military organisations
are structured and the role they play in their
national societies are far-reaching. Over the past
one or two hundred years the peripheral coun-
tries have imported with their weapons a military
division of labour shaped by the technology of
the advanced industrial countries from which the
weapons were obtained.
The countries of the Third World do not have to
adopt the division of labour established in the
professional armies of the central countries to
make use of their imported weapons. But as a
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Military Nation International
Organisation State System
Technology
Economy
Political
Structure
Class
Structure
historical pattern the link between military pro-
fessionalism and the absorbtion of external
technology is extremely powerful. Professional
soldiers identify themselves with the organisations
they control and accordingly choose weapons
which the latter can assimilate. By the same
process the increasingly complex hardware they
import from abroadthe tanks, the jet aircraft
and missilestend to accentuate the complexity
of the military establishment. Once set in motion,
this process of professionalisation on the one
hand and absorption of external technology on
the other tends to be self generating. (It should
be noted that this is largely independent of the
particular source of technology imports: Soviet
or Czechoslovak military hardware reproduces
military organisations just as well as American,
French or British.)
It has sometimes been contended that it is
precisely its training in the use of advanced
technology which gives the military a special role
to play in the 'modernisation' of the less
developed countries. The position is stated by
Lucian Pye in an article published in the l950s
which in some ways became a self-fulfilling
prophecy because of the way it was used to make
the military assistance programmes of the United
States government seem respectable. As Pye puts
it
"Above all else . . . the revolution in military
technology has caused the army leaders of the
newly emergent countries to be extremely
sensitive to the extent to which their countries
are economically and technologically under-
developed. Called upon to perform roles basic
to advanced societies, the more politically con-
scious officers can hardly avoid being aware of
the need for more substantial changes in their
own societies" (Pye 1962: 78).
But training in the use of sophisticated weapons
does not mean that army officers are more skilled
or progressive in their attitudes than any other
elite groups. The military has a special place in
Third World societies not because its technology
is 'modern', but because it is a particular kind
of technology, that of force. And force is never
used in the abstract, but in the struggle between
different classes and groups. The functions of
military force are different in situations of rev-
olutionary change (as in Cuba, Mozambique or
China); of broad social reform imposed by the
military and other elite groups from above (as in
Peru or Nasser's Egypt); yet again where it is
used mainly to reproduce the existing regime and
class structure (as in Iran); to change the regime
in the interests of local or international economi-
cally dominant classes (as in Chile); or merely to
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secure (as in Uganda) the dominance of a para-
sitic military establishment.
The critical role of force in securing stability---
or the power of dominant political groups and
classeshas led to increased research in so-called
'counter-insurgency'. This has produced not only
sophisticated technology such as that of the
'electronic battlefield' (Klare, 1972), but also
greater attention to the 'software' of communica-
tions, propaganda and surveillance over the
civilian population. Its results are directly dis-
seminated by the military assistance programmes
of the major powers, particularly the USA. Not
only do countries like Iran, Indonesia, Brazil,
Chile or Zaire import large quantities of equip-
ment, they also receive technical assistance from
the CIA and similar agencies in organising the
intelligence and propaganda networks on which
the security of those who control the state
apparatus depends.
Let us now look a little more closely at the inter-
national mechanisms by which the techniques of
force are proliferated. In the first place there is
technological competition. Third World countries
take part in it only as clients of the greater
powers willing to sell or donate them the neces-
sary arms or production facilities. The precise
form that the transferred technology takes is
therefore shaped by the dialectic of the arms
races taking place between the supplying (indus-
trial) rather than the receiving (peripheral)
countries. It is distorted in the direction of mili-
tary hardwarelike advanced jet aircraft or
tankswhich fits in with the existing production
patterns of the former rather than the latter.
Yet technical progress has a logic of its own
which sometimes throws up consequences which
the major industrial powers neither desire, nor
are able, given the intense competition for
markets and spheres of influence, to keep fully
under their control. The new generations of port-
able anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, for
example, have been put to very effective use
against conventional forces by the liberation
fighters of Vietnam, Palestine or Mozambique.
The Americans can now produce small guided
"cruise" missiles capable of delivering nuclear
warheads with great accuracy over long distances
and at a small fraction of the cost of the ICBMs
which are now the mainstay of the great powers'
nuclear armouries. These have been the subject
of heated arguments at the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks. The USA has thus far resisted
attempts to make a ban on the development and
production of cruise missiles a part of the arms
limitation agreements, although it maintains that
under no circumstances will they be supplied to
third countries, even close allies. Yet it must
surely be only a matter of time before they are
more widely produced and marketed. Nuclear
technology itself is within reach of a number
of the larger or more advanced developing coun-
tries such as India, Brazil or Israel, where
despite the surveillance of the International
Atomic Energy Authority over international
transactions in nuclear materials and technology,
it is becoming more and more difficult to prevent
the development of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes from spilling over into more warlike
uses.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty attempts to deal
with a very real danger of the proliferation of
the means of mass nuclear destruction. Yet it is
easy to understand the cynicism of countries like
Argentina or Pakistanor indeed of producers
and suppliers like France and Chinaabout
agreements which in their nature create a cartel
of the great powers in the means of destruction,
thus stabilising the existing balance of power in
the international system; particularly so when
the major world powers themselves have made
little serious effort to limit their own technologi-
cal competition.
But would the ability of the large powers to
intervene militarily and politically in the Third
World be any the less if some of the latter
countries controlled their own means of mass
destruction? How far would it on the other
hand increase the regional sub-imperialism of
wealthier countries like Brazil, Iran or India, at
the expense of their less powerful neighbours?
Would it merely make the world a more
dangerous place to live in by proliferating
dangerous weapons whilst not fundamentally
altering the dependence of peripheral countries
on the suppliers of their arms and technology?
Conversely, how far is the military ascendance
of the major powers actually increased by their
enormous technological superiority? The peculiar
feature of nuclear arms is that there are almost
no circumstances in which either side in a con-
flict would dare to use them. The major powers
continue to rely on conventional forces to
stabilise existing international arrangements like
NATO and the Warsaw Pact and to increase
their spheres of influence (viz the Soviet Union's
build up of naval fleets in the Mediterranean and
Indian Ocean). The ability of the great powers
to intervene with force in other parts of the
world depends on their vast stocks of conven-
tional armaments. Indeed, the production, opera-
tion and development of nuclear weapons and
their delivery systems takes up only 10-15 per
cent of total world military expenditures.
lt is doubtful whether the acquisition of missiles
and advanced nuclear technology by Third World
countries would itself make up for their techni-
cal and quantitative inferiority in terms of con-
ventional weapons. This fact is well appreciated
by the few Third World countries which are in
a good position to build up their military forces.
In a recent television interview with the BBC,
the Shah of Iran admitted that it was unrealistic
for Iran to engage in nuclear competition with
the USA, USSR, France or Britain. But he said
it was his ambition to make the Iranian armed
forces the largest and best equipped (with non-
nuclear arms) in the world.
Yet the greater sophistication and quantity of
the conventional weapons available to large
powers is not always militarily decisive. Tech-
nology, as already noted, may be turned on its
head by more effective ways of putting social
organisation and technology together. The Viet-
nam War illustrates perfectly the difficulties of
using capital intensive methods of warfare against
a population that is politically and militarily
highly mobilised. To be sure, military R & D.
has developed technical solutions to get around
some of these limitsdefoliants, for example,
helicopters and gunships and the 'electronic
battlefield'. In Vietnam they merely contributed
to the military stalemate from which the US
government was eventually forced to pull out
its forces. But their transfer to Latin America
has undoubtedly made the repression of revolu-
tionary guerrilla groups more effective.
At the same time, professional military establish-
ments have consciously made use of the lessons
of revolutionary military organisation. As Regis
Debray puts it, "Socialist revolution revolu-
tionises the counterrevolution" (Debray, 1973:
150). Mao Tse Tung's doctrines of revolutionary
war are taught in the academies and staff colleges
of the advanced capitalist countries as well as in
those countries like Brazil, Indonesia or indeed
South Africa. Nevertheless the basic limitations
remain. Professional armiesbe they those of the
Western powers or those of Third World coun-
tries modelled upon themcan neither fight
'people's wars' nor always be certain of success
against them by virtue of their technological
superiority.
Economic Dependence and the Inteniational
Arms Economy
What are the main factors responsible for the
growth in military expenditures in the Third
World? And what are the effects of the expan-
sion of the military upon patterns of national
development?
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To begin with, there are the pressures which arise
from the logic of military organisations them
selves. In some ways modern armies are like in-
dustrial firms. They are organised around a large
physical plant of capital equipment, employ a
numerous labour force of men in uniform and
coordinate their activities in a hierarchical
structure controlled by military managers, the
members of the officer corps. Yet there are cer-
tain critical differences. In the first place it is
hard to say just what the 'output' is: fighting
wars, preparing for wars they never fight,
national security, or violence and insecurity;
intervention when the police and civilian
authorities are unable to deal with internal dis-
turbances, the mailed fist of the ruling class,
making and breaking regimes by military coups,
symbolising national sovereignty and independ-
ence?
It is peculiarly difficult therefore to apply criteria
of economic cost-effectiveness to military spend-
ing and activity. In a conflict-ridden nation or in
a volatile international situation the threats to
security which exist or can be invented are
almost without limit. The situation is exacerbated
because technical progress makes weapons
systems obsolete almost as soon as they are
introduced. Military men in developing countries
usually complain that their armies, navies and air
forces are weak and badly equipped by inter-
national standards. The gap is indeed real, though
the standards of judgement applied to it are
influenced by the arms salesman and military
training programmes of the rich countries.
Such pressures for military growth must be pre-
sumed to exist in most Third World countries
which have professional armies. They do not,
however, help explain the great variation in
levels of military spending between different
developing countries set forth in Table 2.
Armies are in a unique position to extract the
resources they want by blackmailing, coercing
or taking over governments. Yet a cursory glance
at Table 2 confirms that military regimes spend
little more on armaments than their civilian
counterparts.'
Nor does it seem that authoritarian regimes
spend much more on armaments than their
1 This observation is on the whole confirmed by the detailed
studies that have been made of the relation between military
regimes, arms spending and economic performance. See for
examplr R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan, 1975. who
found that developing countries under military regimes had
armies no larger and spent no more of their national product
on the military than countries under civilian regimes which
had also experienced periods of military rule. Both categ'rles,
however, had larger armed forces and spent more of their
GNP on the military than develoning countries which had
never been under military rule, though this difference was
not statistically significant.
neighbours. Some of the world's more repressive
regimesHaiti, for example, Malawi, Swaziland,
Paraguay, Nicaragua, Uganda and Argentina
are proportionately low military spenders. This
is partly because the financial costs of internal
repression are not usually high since it is not
capital intensive and is often underwritten by
large powers. Low spending is possible, further-
more, because many such countriesparticularly
in Africa and Latin Americaare relatively in-
sulated from the major sources of international
conflict.
For it is the international influences on levels of
military spending which make the most differ-
ence. In the first place, a good part of the varia-
tion can be accounted for by the concentration
of hard currency earnings in the hands of parti-
cular Third World countries which control re-
sources that are strategic for the economic
expansion of the major powers. The heaviest
increases in military spending in recent years
have taken place in the oil-rich countries of the
Middle East, which (together with Egypt, Jordan
and Syria whose military spending they sub-
sidise) form the majority of countries devoting
more than 10 per cent of their GNP to arma-
ments (see Table 2).
The other major determinant of military spend-
ing is (not surprisingly) armed conflict itself-
actual or threatenedboth inside nations and
between them. Almost all the countries shown in
Table 2 whose military burden exceeded 10 per
cent of GNP in 1974 were involved in the wars
of liberation in Indo-China, the Arab-Israel con-
flict or are oil producers. The only exceptions are
the USSR and North Vietnam which fit better
with the next group, those which spend between
five and ten per cent of their GNP, made up of:
NATO and Warsaw Pact powers; China and
Taiwan; Portugal (still at the time fighting rev-
olutionary movements in its African colonies);
Pakistan (conflict with India); Somalia (border
conflicts with Ethiopia and Kenya); Nigeria and
Chad (fighting or having recently fought civil
wars); and two more oil producers (Libya and
Qatar).
What are the effects of military spending on
patterns of national developmentor under-
developmentin the Third World? Unlike firms
or production units, armies do not create the
surplus value which sustains their own expan-
sion. The resources have to be provided from
taxation or by subsidies from international
patrons and suppliers of arms. In the first place
this puts the military in a special position rela-
tive to the remainder of the state machinery
through which the necessary resources have to
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be raised internally or negotiated externally.
Second, it implies a degree of integration in the
international economy from which internation-
ally negotiable purchasing power has to be
obtained in order to acquire military hardware.
Yet the implications of this interrelation between
military spending, state appropriation of surpluses
and the international economy are little touched
on in existing discussions, which the most part
attempt to measure the overall effect of military
spending on aggregate measures of economic
performance. From one of the most compre-
hensive crossnational studies of the effects of
arms spending (Benoit, 1973), we learn that levels
of military spending in developing countries are
(contrary to expectation) positively associated
with non-military growth rates (i.e. rates of GNP
growth, taking out the military expenditure com-
ponent of GNP). But the causal direction of this
correlation is not established. It could occur
merely because countries with high GNP growth
rates have more to spend on arms. Or the rela-
tionship could be spurious in the sense that
military spending and high measured growth in
non-military GNP may both be the product of
other influences, such as the tendency of the
major powers to pump economic development
assistance as well as military aid into countries
in which they have strategic interests.
Such discussions presuppose, furthermore, that
we are mainly interested in growth rates rather
than development defined in terms of broader
criteria including how GNP is distributed. An
explanation sometimes offered for the association
between arms spending and growthor rather
for why there is not a negative association
between themis that the resources for arma-
ments are typically diverted from social welfare
spending rather than from productive investment.
Statistical comparisons of developing countries
(Schmitter, 1971) on the whole support this ex-
planation. But it is a serious matter to divert
resources from schools, hospitals and welfare
services to guns, tanks and jet aircraft, and most
probably can only be done by governments which
are prepared in the final analysis to repress the
discontent it brings about.
Even if one were to accept at face value the
evidence that arms spending promotes growth
it is difficult to find a sensible explanation for
it. Military spending, to be sure, has some spin-
offs, but it is hard to see how these could offset
more than a small proportion of the cost of
maintaining a large military establishment, except
in those few countries like Brazil, Argentina or
India which have arms industries of their own,
backed by a relatively diversified industrial base.
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Even here, many of the multiplier effects of
military equipment purchases are felt by the
arms industries of international suppliers rather
than in the domestic economy, with consequent
pressure on the balance of payments.
Nevertheless there is a certain logic to military
spending because it plays a role in reproducing
certain structural patterns commonly found in
peripheral economies. Armaments may facilitate
growth within the constraints established by such
patterns, though at the same time tying up re-
sources that could be put to much better use
under alternative structural arrangements. What
are the patterns that military spending supports
and how does it do so? The main ingredients
are as follows, though I should emphasise that
different developing countries share in them to a
different extent, and what I describe is very
much a paradigm case:
1, Role of military spending in concentrating
the capital and resources required for fast GNP
growth in peripheral capitalist economies. Put
simplistically, growth under these conditions re-
quires forced saving, increased social inequality
and the diversion of government spending from
welfare to production and/or subsidies for
capital. There are strong inflationary pressures
and recurrent crises in the balance of payments.
These pressures can only be dealt with, or so
it is suggested, by governments which are pre-
pared to hold down wages and rural incomes
and to use military force to put down trades
unions, strikes and peasant protest. This results
in higher military expenditure, less because in-
ternal repression itself is costly, than because
soldiers have to be rewarded for carrying it out.
High military expenditure in turn requires extra
forced saving and increases inflationary pressure
and public unrest.
2. Role of the military in strengthening the state
structure and its control over the process of
economic growth. The arguments just put for-
ward about the role of military force in resolving
the crises to which peripheral economies are
prone assume that military force is effective in
redistributing resources for capital formation and
in repressing the conflict created by inequality
and inflation. But the political pressures which
build up in such situations often make stability
problematic. The syndrome of military expan-
sion, inequality, inflation, discontent, repression
and further military expansion is all too common.
Perhaps all one can conclude is that military
force allows a greater concentration of resources
in the hands of the state than would otherwise
he possible (without necessarily accepting that a
powerful state structure is any the better at hand-
ling the economic and political crises to which
such societies are prone).
The military establishment itself of course has
a direct interest in a powerful and centralised
state, since it can extract through it the resources
for its own expansion. Even in countries such
as Brazil where the military elite has explicitly
embraced a capitalist strategy for development,
the predilection of soldiers for state management
of that developmentfor planning, for estab-
lishing enterprises under state or mixed owner-
ship, for licensing and controlling economic acti-
vityhas made itself felt.
A built-in alliance between armaments and
the international expansion of capital into peri-
pheral countries. From the point of view of
foreign capital and Western governments a large
and powerful military establishment often seems
to guarantee the conditions under which profits
can be repatriated from peripheral countries. As
Robert MacNamara once put it to a US Congress
Subcommittee, "the essential role of the Latin
American military as a stabilising force out-
weighs any risks involved in providing (US) mili-
tary assistance for internal security purposes"
(quoted in Klare, 1972: 287). In the last resort
the military can be cajoled or persuaded into
reversing programmes of revolutionary change:
the overthrow of the Allende regime by the
Chilean armed forces with the active support of
the CIA and of foreign corporations like ITF
being the most glaring recent example. Direct
foreign intervention as in Chile is seldom re-
quired, however, for:
The military usually has its own interests at
stake in the alliance with foreign capital, brought
into being because arms spending adds to the
pressure to increase or conserve hard currency
earnings and to attract foreign investment. The
military's preference for state-managed develop-
ment may actually strengthen such tendencies
rather than detracting from them. The alliance
of state and international capital, created through
central planning, licensing and import control,
joint ventures and management agreements, is a
well-documented feature of many Third World
countries. Military expansion supports this ten-
dency as much under civilian governments such
as those of Malaysia, Kenya or Venezuela as
under military regimes like those of Indonesia,
Nigeria or Brazil (even though it may add to the
pressures on the former to succumb to military
rule in the longer run).
Such is the paradigm. But few countries fit it
in all respects. In the first place the symbiosis of
military expansion and dependent capitalism
generates contradictions: both in the terms of
the cycle of military spending, forced saving, in-
flation, and repression, penetrating the military
itself. Even military elites committedlike that
of Brazilto an orthodox strategy of capitalist
development in close association with foreign
investment face internal struggles against officers
who advocate economic nationalism and greater
state control over the economy (Stepan, 1971).
In countries like Peru, Ethiopia, Libya and Egypt
(under Nasser) it is the military radicals who
have prevailed and have effected quite sweeping
changes, including nationalisations of key sectors
of the economy.
Differences in links with the international
economy also create major variations. First,
particular countries do not have to operate within
foreign exchange constraints. Indeed in the oil-
rich countries military spending is about the
fastest way of realising surplus hard currency
earnings. A cynic would say that the availability
of such earnings in countries such as Iran, Saudi
Arabia and more debatably Nigeria, merely re-
moves all obstacles to the expansion of the state
apparatus and makes it easier to buy off or
suppress internal contradictions, without funda-
mental change in the structure of the economy
or links with the international economic system.
Nevertheless, oil surpluses give radical regimes
like those of Algeria or Libya more room in
which to manoeuvre, even if they expose them
to the same temptations to buy arms and proli-
ferate soldiers and bureaucrats as the more con-
servative countries.
Second, contradictions in the international sys-
tem alleviate some of the obstacles to national
development strategies created by international
capital. Peru has been able to play the major
capitalist powers off against each other, buying
arms from Britain, France, and even the USSR
while never completely breaking with the USA.
Despite nationalising large sectors of the
economy, the present Ethiopian military regime
continues to receive arms and assistance from the
USA intended to counterbalance the Soviet
military presence in Somalia.
Most important of all, there are several Third
World countries (Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Somalia,
Angola, Uganda, Tanzania, India) which are sup-
plied very largely or entirely by countries within
the socialist bloc. Not all these countries are
socialist themselves, by any stretch of the imagi-
nation. Yet there is no doubt that socialist arms
sales and assistance make a real difference to the
recipient countries, enabling them to arm them-
selves without having to earn large amounts of
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hard currency in the world market (though some
of them find the economic conditions laid down
by their socialist suppliers almost as onerous).
In some the only effect of socialist, like Western,
arms and military assistance is to allow an op-
pressive regime to survive (like Amin's in
Uganda, now heavily dependent on Soviet mili-
tary support). The tendency in most of them is
toward state capitalism and military-bureaucratic
control of the development process rather than
full-scale socialist transformation, for which
socialist military assistance is probably a neces-
sary but not a sufficient condition.
How, then, do the dynamics of the international
arms economy affect national patterns of develop-
ment in the countries which are exposed to it?
Broadly speaking the accumulation of armaments
in peripheral countries is linked to the accumula-
tion of capital in the central capitalist countries:
both directly in that military spending in the
Third World creates markets for the arms indus-
tries of the industrial countries; and indirectly
in that it increases pressures on Third World
countries to earn the hard currency for their
military purchases by trading in the world market
or encouraging the inflow of foreign investment.
Nevertheless this international arms economy is
itself riven by contradictory pressures which
make its analysis extremely complex:
1. In the first place the flow of armaments in-
ternationally is partly determined by the logic
of accumulation and arms production in the
major capitalist arms producing countries, espe-
cially the USA, Britain, France, West Germany,
Canada and in recent years Japan. The impetus
comes from three sources:
the logic of arms production itself. Because
R & D is a high proportion of total production
costs, long production runs are required to justify
the initial outlay, creating strong pressures to
market armaments abroad. Such pressures have
increased because of the escalation in the cost
of major items of military equipment and have
affected the European arms producers the most,
because their national military forces absorb a
smaller proportion of the total weapons output
than those of the USA or USSR (Kaldor, 1972).
pressures from the interrelation between arms
production and the process of capital accumula-
tion in the central capitalist countries. Here we
are on more controversial ground, the issue
having been debated with particular bitterness
in the USA as a result of the Vietnam War.2
There are those on the one hand who argue that
2 The literature on this debate is too large to Cite in detail
here. There are useful summaries in Rosen, 3970.
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the enormous increases of arms production have
helped the US economy overcome the crises of
over-production to which capitalist economies
are prone. The Vietnam war in sum was good
for American capitalism. But others argue that
the military-industrial alliance between the arms
producing firms and the Pentagon has to the
contrary diverted resources away from the pro-
ductive investment and brought about inflation.
Although the Vietnam War was good for the US
arms producers, it is argued, it put great strain
on the productive capacity of American capital-
ism. Whichever of these diagnoses of American
capitalism is correct, however, they both imply
pressure to market arms to the Third World,
be it because of the search for markets to make
use of spare industrial capacity or to alleviate
balance of payments difficulties arising from
America's own military spending.
(e) pressures arising fron-ï the relation be-
tween armaments and the international economy.
In a general way capital will be invested in arms
production so long as there is an international
market for weapons. Arms exports, furthermore,
play a critical role in resolving crises in the inter-
national economy such as that created by the
redistribution of international purchasing power
towards the oil producing countries. One of the
major ironies of recent history is the way the
crisis in the international economy precipitated
by oil price increases has been partly bought
off by the escalation of the arms race in the
Middle East.
The pressures arising at these different levels-
the specific requirements of capital invested in
arms production, the logic of capital accumula-
tion in the central capitalist economies, and the
logic of world-wide capital accumulationmay
be in conflict, though no doubt their overall
effect is to increase the pressure on the industrial
countries to export arms to the Third World.
Politicians in Britain, for example, are under
great pressure to subsidise the production of
armaments and to promote their export, rather
than to permit the curtailment of existing pro-
duction or the postponement of new investment,
however strong the case that large-scale arms
production is bad for the British economy in
the long run. This is partly because of the pre-
sumed short-term effects of redundancies in the
economy, and partly a matter of the economics
of remaining a world power. Investment in arms
production and the despatch of arms salesmen
to the Middle East makes senseit is alleged-
if it maintains Britain's capacity to develop wea-
pons for its own use. The contradictions inherent
in this position were made particularly clear re-
cently by the commitments to sell almost the
entire production of the next generation of Chief-
tain tanks protected by the revolutionary new
Chobham armour to Iran, thereby postponing
deliveries to the British army.
2. The economic forces sustaining the arms
trade are modified by the fact that it is also an
instrument of the states and ruling classes of
the powers which exercise or aspire to hegemony
within the international system. Just as the main
importers of arms are the governments and
military establishments of developing countries,
so the suppliers are either the governments of
the supplying countries themselves or large firms
closely inter-linked with these governments. The
governments of the industrial countries either
negotiate arms exports directly themselves, take
a direct part in the promotion efforts of their
main domestic arms producers, or push them in-
directly through arms exporting firms which
sometimes act (like certain British arms suppliers)
in all respects as cover for the governments' own
arms sales. Exports are usually licensed to ensure
they reach the 'approved' recipient and are not
diverted elsewhere, and above all, the supply
of arms is consciously used by governments to
enlarge their spheres of political influence and to
promote their non-military trade and investment.
It is common for arms sales and military assis-
tance to form part of a wider 'package', inclu-
ding trade and investment agreements or political
accords, which may either be spelt out openly
like the Treaty of Friendship between the Soviet
Union and Egypt which Anwar Sadat recently
repudiated, or form part of a more subterranean
framework of economic and political under-
standings. Finally, a large proportion of the trade
is subsidised, increasing the ability of Third
World governments to absorb huge quantities of
armaments. Virtually all arms sales and military
assistance provided by the countries of the
socialist bloc are subsidised and much still is
given free. In the l950s and l960s the greater
part of arms transfers from the USA were also
subsidised under the Military Assistance Pro-
gram; though cash and credit sales now predomi-
nate over grants.
3. The competition in the world market for
arms between societies based on antagonistic-
socialist and capitalistmodes of production has
a distinctive impact on both the economics and
the politics of the arms trade. Even if the overall
effect of the cold war is to reduce the price of
the arms supplied to developing countries, it un-
doubtedly increases their volume and total value.
This has three major implications. First it in-
creases the flow of resources towards the arms
industries of the arms suppliers and increases
the power and resources of their respective mili-
tary-industrial complexes. Second, in so doing it
helps to maintain the pace of technological in-
novation, increasing the complexity and cost of
weapons in the long run. Third, subsidised arms
supplies often increase rather than decrease the
military outlays of developing countries: both
directly through added local costs such as wages
and accommodation and through imports of non-
military supplies required to support larger mili-
tary forces; and indirectly by increasing the
TABLE 3
Total Arms Transfers, By Suppliers and Recipient Regions 1965-1974
($ million)
Major Capitalist Suppliers Major Socialist Suppliers Other Total
Suppliers
Recipient
Regions
USA France UK West Germany Canada USSR Czechoslovakia China
and Poland
World Total 31,563 2.826 2,089 1,221 1,187 18,793 2,481 2,119 2,125 64,404
NATO 8,447 770 505 724 893 515 11,854
Warsaw Pact 5,674 1,888 5 35 7.602OPEC...... 2,374 668 662 154 89 2,152 136 570 6,825
East Asia ...... 14,640 40 145 23 32 4,049 15 1,616 321 20,881
South Asia...... 139 271 98 36 10 1,706 159 335 36 2,922
Middle East 5,628 461 603 181 45 5,733 337 2 465 13,455Africa ......... 341 669 258 73 17 711 68 81 263 2,481
Latin America 811 463 269 137 172 323 2 229 2,406
Source: World Military Expenditures and the Arms Trade 1964-1974
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1976
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power of the military establishment's claim on
national resources. Finally, to the extent that
hegemonic powers like the USA or France are
actually successful in using military links to keep
particular countries like Chile or Gabon within
their respective spheres of influence, the economic
benefits they hope for may well exceed the costs
of the subsidy.
4. The expansion in the international market
for arms is greatly accentuated by the presence
in the Third World itself of nodal points of
international political conflict such as the Arab-
Israeli conflict; the border disputes between India
and Pakistan and India and China; the border
conflicts between Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya;
and the struggle for black rule in Southern
Africa. Trends in the international arms trade
can to some extent be explained in terms of the
'demand' for armaments created by such con-
ificts, though competition between the major
suppliers reacts back upon the political situation,
tending to accelerate local arms races.
The effect of this complex interaction between
the arms trade and struggles for political hege-
mony on the flow of armaments from the major
suppliers to the different regions of the Third
World can be seen in Table 3. By far the biggest
recipients of arms from 1965 to 1974 were the
countries of East Asia and the Middle East, the
dozen leading importers being (in descending
order of magnitude): South Vietnam, Israel, Iran,
Egypt, South Korea, Syria, India, Taiwan, Paki-
stan, North Korea and Saudi Arabia.
Transfers of arms to East Asia have declined
because of the end of the Vietnam war. US
arms sales and military assistance have consis-
tently exceeded transfers from the socialist coun-
tries by a factor of over three to one, mainly
because the US supplied large quantities of arma-
ments to its allies at the fringe of the main
conflictThailand, the Philippines, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Taiwan, South Koreaas well as to
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
In the Middle East military spending has grown
at a staggering 19 per cent per annum over the
past ten years. The transfer of arms from the
advanced capitalist powers has more or less kept
pace with transfers from the socialist bloc. But
if one disaggregates within the region, Israel,
Iran, Jordan and Saudi Arabia were almost ex-
clusively supplied by the USA, Britain, France
and West Germany; and Egypt, Syria and Iraq
by the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. The
countries of the Persian Gulf have purchased the
greater part of their arms from capitalist sup-
pliers at commercial rates, whereas those involved
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in the Arab-Israeli conflict have been extensively
subsidised: with the result that the value of arms
transferred to the former has been about half
that of those imported by the latter, despite a
similar level and growth of military expenditure
in both sub-regions.
The growth of military spending in Africa has
also been fast, though relative to low starting
levels. By far the heaviest spenders in the con-
tinent have been Libya, South Africa, Algeria
and Nigeria. The import figures reflect the con-
tinuing influence of the former colonial powers
in the region, particularly that of France in her
former colonies; the relative absence of US arms
supplies, except in one or two individual countries
like Ethiopia and Zaire; and a degree of
socialist penetration, especially by the USSR in
Algeria, Libya, Uganda and Somalia and by
China in Tanzania. Several countries, including
most notably Nigeria and Libya, have diversified
sources of supply, obtaining a substantì3l pro-
portion of their arms from capitalist and socialist
camps alike.
The countries of South Asia have moved away
from the colonial metropolis, and are now
largely supplied by the socialist blocIndia,
Bangladesh and Afghanistan by the Soviet Union,
Pakistan by China (as well as by the USA and
France). After increasing during the 1960s due
to border conflicts between India, Pakistan and
China, arms imports are now declining.
Latin America (except Cuba) is the only world
region which is exclusively dependent on the
advanced capitalist powers for its arms supplies.
Imports have increased, but at the same time
there has been diversification away from the
USA towards France, the UK and West Ger-
many, brought about both by the US govern-
ment's ban on exports of advanced weapons to
the region (now lifted) and by the economic
nationalism of Latin American regimes.
To sum up, the nexus between militarism and
international capitalism is found in its pure form
only in Latin America and in those countries in
Africa, the Middle East and East Asia which
buy all their arms from the West. Even so, many
of them have diversified in order to escape the
influence of a single previously dominant sup-
plier, be it the USA in Latin America or the
former colonial powers in the Caribbean or
Africa. Yet their military expansion is still con-
nected to the system of internationi capitalism
inasmuch as they rely on international purchasing
power earned in the world market to finance
their armies.
Competition among the capitalist arms suppliers
and the struggle for hegemony between them
and socialist suppliers are both responsible for
an increased transfer of military resources to the
Third World. The powerful socialist presence in
the Middle East and Asia is thus two edged,
permitting disengagement from the West to an
extent that is seldom possible in Latin America;
but simultaneously raising the stakes in local con-
flicts, reinforcing military and bureaucratic con-
trol over the state apparatus; increasing military
outlays; and expanding the market for the arms
of the capitalist countries in equal measure to
the inflow of socialist-provided weapons.
The final outcome depends very much on the
nature of the struggle and of the groups to which
the support of the socialist countries is given.
Socialist support for liberation movements with
a genuine prospect of socialist transformation and
disengagement from the capitalist world econ-
omy, as in the wars of Indo-China and in former
Portuguese Africa, is one thing. But military assis-
tance given by socialist countries to authoritarian
military or one-party regimes for reasons of
international power politics is quite another. The
paradox is that the latter supports a superstruc-
ture of political links with Third World countries,
while at the same time permitting many of them
to remain internationally dependent on the world
economy and to repress socialism internally. Such
a situation is inherently unstable, for client states
which do not have strong internal reasons for
associating with the socialist bloc can, like Egypt,
go elsewhere for arms if they do not like the
conditions laid down.
This is but one aspect of a pervasive contradic-
tion between the economic logic and the political
functions of the arms trade. Socialist arms sup-
pliers face it because they transfer arms to peri-
pheral countries incorporated in a world market,
which, both in general and for arms in particular,
is still mainly organised on capitalist principles.
For capitalist countries, on the other hand, the
contradiction arises even more directly because
of the link between the international arms trade
and their own capital accumulation. When an
arms producer is obliged to sell arms abroad to
absorb high R & D expenditures, to sustain capital
accumulation and to solve balance-of-payments
difficulties, it is that much harder to use the
promise of arms supplies or the threat of with-
holding them to influence the political behaviour
of purchasers. At the same time competition be-
tween the main arms supplierssocialist and
capitalist alikehas made it difficult for any one
of them to secure a lasting monopoly over trans-
fers to any particular country or region, of the
type which the USA previously enjoyed in Latin
America.
The events of the past ten years have seen a
strengthening of the economic forces increasing
the arms trade including: accelerated technolo-
gical progress in arms production; strong econ-
omic pressure within capitalist arms producing
countries to sell abroad; an international shift
in purchasing power to the OPEC countries: and
the concentration of production in and greater
competition between large arms-producing con-
glomerates like Lockheed, Dassault or the British
Aircraft Corporation. The growth of the inter-
national market for arms has helped the major
capitalist powers to avert the present crisis in
the international economy. But this has been
achieved at some cost to their ability to guarantee
the political conditions for the expansion of
capital at the periphery, except in particular
regions or sub-regions like Latin America or the
Persian Gulf not yet open to socialist diplomacy
and military assistance.
The countries of the Third World can only
escape the hegemony of the major powers if they
make good use of such contradictions. Disarma-
nient is a critical element of any strategy of dis-
engagement because of the way that arms races
increase the dependence of countries of the Third
World upon their suppliers. But it must be dis-
armament which takes account of the realities of
international struggle. One could not, for in-
stance, expect either governments or guerrilla
movements to put aside weapons if this left them
defenceless before a hegemonic power or unable
as in Southern Africa to use armed force or the
threat of it to remove fundamental injustices.
What kind of disarmament, for whom and in
what international political and economic con-
juncture are questions that cannot be shirked.
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